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The Russian revolution of  1917 and the social conflict of  the immediate post-First 
World War period created numerous revolutionary, or potentially revolutionary, sit-
uations. Anarchists were active in all of  these situations in Germany, France, and 
Hungary but specifically in Russia itself, Italy, and Spain. The results of  their par-
ticipation were not encouraging: Bolshevik consolidation in Russia; fascist dictator-
ship in Italy; military dictatorship in Spain and elsewhere in Europe. Anarchist 
influence on the social struggles had been at best a secondary issue. By 1923, the 
movement was in decline, facing repression across the continent, with militants im-
prisoned, in exile, or murdered. Anarchist history has been “buried under subse-
quent defeats … when not effaced altogether by its rivals on the Left,” with much 
of  the initial analysis of  its historical role clouded by ideological bias, specifically 
by Marxists whose subjective conclusions have long been refuted by historians who 
have shown the predominantly urban and “proletarian social base of  anarchism.”1  
The decline of  revolutionary anarchism is generally treated in labour movement 
historiography as a logical result of  the development of  a centralized and/or de-
mocratizing state in which the working masses were attracted to movements that 
seemed more in tune with liberal capitalist development, predominantly socialism. 
Sources for this position are extensive given that, to a large extent, revolutionary 
anarchism entered a clear decline in strength. In Europe at least from the 1920s, 
“anarchists are notable by their absence in mainstream histories of  ideas and have 
found only a place on the fringe in most histories of  socialist thought.”2 
Clearly, at the time, anarchists did not accept that the decline of  revolu-
tionary anarchism would be irreversible and sought to learn from the failures of  
the period as a means of  strengthening its future prospects. They believed that the 
injustice and inequality of  capitalist or communist societies would inevitably pro-
voke a new wave of  revolutionary activity at some point in the future. 
This article focuses on the most significant contexts for anarchist revolu-
tionary activity during the period 1917-1923: the 1917 Russian revolution, which 
was in many ways the inspiration for what was to follow; the social unrest of  the 
Trienio Bolchevique in Spain (1918-1920/1); and the factory occupations of  the 
Italian Biennio Rosso (1919-1920). Although anarchists were also active in other 
countries where social unrest occurred during this period such as Germany, France, 
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and even Hungary, it is clear that Russia started the revolutionary progress and 
would impact the revolutionary Left throughout the continent and beyon,d while 
Italy and Spain are countries where the anarchist movement was well developed 
and in close relationship with revolutionary syndicalist organizations. The conflicts, 
complications, and dilemmas resulting from the dependence of  the anarchist rev-
olutionary praxis on its relationship with the working class is the central theme of  
this article.  
Historian Michael Schmidt subdivided the anarchist movement’s history 
into five waves that “rose and fell in accordance with a more general expansion and 
contraction of  objective conditions for the organized popular classes.”  The first 
three waves broadly encompass the classical period: 1868-1894 (Rise of  the Broad 
Anarchist/Syndicalist Movement in the Era of  State and Capitalist Expansion), 
1894-1923 (Consolidation of  Syndicalism and Specific Anarchist Organization in a 
Time of  War and Reaction), and 1924-1949 (Anarchist Revolutions Against Impe-
rialism, Fascism, and Bolshevism).3 After the demise of  the initial “wave” of  anar-
chism associated with the First International and the national organizations it 
inspired, predominantly in France and southern Europe, and the many failures of  
the propaganda of  the deed with its counterproductive acts of  terrorism to achieve 
its revolutionary objectives, anarchist activity became based in working-class cultural 
and economic organizations with its tactics and strategy grounded in revolutionary 
syndicalist theory.    
This article covers the final years of  Schmidt’s third stage, focusing on the 
tactics adopted, the problems faced, and, ultimately, the causes of  the failures ac-
cording to the participants themselves—the anarchists involved in the revolutionary 
movements in the three countries covered. The aim is not to provide a critique of  
the actions of  their opponents (Bolsheviks, Socialists, and governments), but of  
the failure of  anarchists to counteract these and create a force able to bring about 
revolutionary change. Throughout the article the complexities of  the anarchist 
movement must also be borne in mind, as it is impossible to delve into the multiple 
interpretations of  anarchist tactics that existed in what is by its very nature an eclec-
tic movement, based as it is on the principle of  liberty. Some level of  generalization 
is inevitable to achieve a level of  clarity, the clearest example being the use of  generic 
terms such as anarcho-communism and anarcho-syndicalism, but, as the article will 
show, the boundaries between the two tendencies were far from rigid.  
The article begins with a brief  description of  the relationship that evolved 
between the revolutionary syndicalist and anarchist movements prior to the First 
World War. This is followed by a brief  analysis of  the impact the First World War 
had on the movement, specifically the anarchist position towards the First World 
War, working at the division over whether to take sides that in reality had its roots 
in a key aspect of  anarchist revolutionary theory–the importance of  the political 
nature of  the state in which the anarchist movement needed to develop its ideas. A 
more repressive state might elicit a more immediate revolutionary response, but 
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would not allow for a fuller development of  anarchist ideals among the masses—
as opposed to a simplistic “destroy the state” revolt—or debates on issues such as 
organization (necessity, form, and nature), nor relations with the labour movement 
in the press, meetings, conferences, or congresses.  The insurrectional nature of  the 
revolutionary act, represented by a violent (and spontaneous) rising of  the masses, 
dominated the mindset of  many anarchists during this period, despite leading fig-
ures, from Pyotr Kropotkin to Errico Malatesta, warning that the revolution, and 
therefore the violence, would be a long process and would not “be accomplished 
by a stroke, in the twinkling of  an eye.”4 In fact, beyond generalized sketches, an-
archists were also vague on the exact organization of  the future society that the rev-
olution was supposed to create. The revolution required “groundwork” and yet “the 
revolutionary education of  the people” was to be “accomplished by the revolution 
itself.”5 The masses were expected to be the driving force of  the revolution, due to 
an almost naturally perceived understanding of  their position as repressed, with an-
archists guiding but not leading the movement. An element of  ideological prepara-
tion would seem to be essential to help these masses see the way forward and not 
be diverted away from their revolutionary goal. Furthermore, pre-First World War 
revolutionary anarchist theory said little about alternative revolutionary movements’ 
involvement. After addressing, these key issues the article then examines the revo-
lutionary situations in the three countries mentioned, looks at the the role of  the 
anarchists, and analyzes the weaknesses within the anarchist revolutionary praxis 
that played a part in the failure of  the movements in each country. 
 
Anarchism and Revolutionary Syndicalism before the First World War 
The growth of  revolutionary syndicalism following the creation of  the French Con-
fédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in 1895 revitalized the anarchist movement, 
providing a means to rekindle its influence in the organized labour movement, 
specifically in the countries in which the Bakunist section of  the First International 
was dominant.6 The role of  the unions was, therefore, central to any anarchist rev-
olutionary activity, giving them contact with the workers who were expected to bring 
about social change. However, this also brought with it some dilemmas, as it created 
a high level of  dependence on the syndicalist movement and the workers (urban 
workers or peasantry) in general. Without influence in the unions, anarchism would 
be a revolutionary ideology with no revolutionary force. There was a danger that 
syndicalism would engulf  anarchism. Pierre Monatte, the CGT representative at 
the 1907 Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam, claimed that syndicalism, “unlike so-
cialism and anarchism which preceded it,” was based “on actions not theories,” making 
this very point.7 
The Italian anarchist Malatesta cautioned against the potential danger that 
syndicalism was by nature reformist and would be looking to negotiate improve-
ments for its members via negotiation with the state and, as such, could dilute the 
revolutionary zeal of  anarchist and non-anarchist workers.  He argued that anar-
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chists should actively participate in unions in order to propagate anarchist ideals, 
although without assuming positions of  leadership. Another prominent Italian an-
archist, Luigi Galleani, writing the same year as the Amsterdam Congress, stressed 
that “the educational work to be performed among proletarians...appears not only 
as a pressing need but one which cannot be delayed.”8 Tellingly, he wrote this before 
the events covered in this article but he did not change the statement in his 1925 
book. In short, revolutionary syndicalism was not an anarchist but a class move-
ment. For anarchists it was a means to an end, a tactic not an ideology. The shared 
interests and potential benefits of  a closer relationship with the labour movement 
were evident as was the potential for discord, although this remained mainly at the 
level of  debate before 1917. While Schmidt and sociologist Lucien van der Walt 
claim that class struggle anarchism, “is the only anarchism,” the problem is that 
many anarchists of  the period would disagree whilst expressing fear that the class 
politics associated with syndicalism had the potential to denaturalize anarchism.9 
 
The Impact of  the First World War (1914-1918) 
Despite its relative growth in influence associated with the revolutionary syndicalist 
organization in the immediate prewar period the anarchist movement across Europe 
continued to be divided and largely disorganized and to have relatively little influence 
among the working classes. In France, anarchists could be found in the syndicalist 
Confédération Générale du Travail, although their influence had waned significantly 
in the decade before the war.10 In Spain, anarchists played a central role in the cre-
ation of  the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) in 1910; however, by 1914 
the movement was once more in “disarray,” unable to organize and with most of  
its leading figures in jail or exile.11 In Italy, despite the creation of  the Unione Sin-
dacale Italiana (USI) in 1912, the anarchist movement had experienced a decline 
since the First International and leading militants were forced to live in exile.12 In 
fact, across Europe, despite the impulse given by revolutionary syndicalism, the an-
archist movement was dwarfed by socialist parties and unions. 
The First World War may have proved the lie to the Second International’s 
claims of  internationalism as workers lined up to sign on to fight for their countries 
in the continental conflict. However, this war was also equally damaging to revolu-
tionary syndicalism and anarchism: working-class internationalism had clearly taken 
second place to bourgeois-inspired nationalism. Millions of  those who were the 
supposed victims of  capitalist exploitation did not hesitate to risk their lives to de-
fend the system but they expected a fairer, albeit still capitalist, society, with homes 
fit for heroes, up on their return. Despite the initial collapse of  social democratic 
internationalism, it would be the socialist (or labour) parties on a national level that 
would reap the benefit of  their collaboration in the war during postwar European 
society’s reappraisal of  the political aims by becoming one of  the two main parties, 
and the party of  the working class, in most countries of  Western Europe. Nonethe-
less, the growing number of  people disaffected with the apparently never-ending 
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slaughter as well as the social and economic crisis it was creating would lead to 
growing social tension pushing at the gates of  revolutionary action. 
Within the international anarchist movement, a split emerged in relation 
to the war with leading anarchist figures led by Kropotkin coming out in favour of  
an Entente victory, which provoked an immediate response from the majority of  
anarchists whose chief  defender was the Italian Errico Malatesta. Beyond the basic 
arguments of  anarchist anti-militarism and the question of  bourgeois nationalism, 
the debates between the two leading figures—both exiled in London at the time—
demonstrate two visions of  the revolutionary anarchist project. While there were 
fundamental differences within the international anarchist movement, all sides 
agreed on one main point—the realization of  an anarchist revolution was still some 
way off.  
Kropotkin felt that victorious German militarism would imperil “both the 
relative liberties wrested from the state over the last hundred years, and the future 
possibility of  achieving an anarchist society.”13 The Germans must be defeated be-
cause although anarchists “wanted the reconciliation of  peoples, including the Ger-
man people, we think that they must resist an aggressor who represents the 
destruction of  all our hopes of  liberation.”14  In a war between bourgeois democracy 
and militarist totalitarianism, anarchists could not be indifferent to the consequences 
of  the latter emerging victorious. The irony that Tsarist Russia was fighting alongside 
France and Britain to a certain extent only reinforced the issue—Kropotkin knew 
from personal experience the limitations such a political system placed on the po-
tential for anarchist activity. This argument’s logical corollary goes to the very heart 
of  one of  anarchism’s paradoxes: the need for the movement to be able to operate 
and promote the evolution of  anarchist ideals in a non-anarchist society. If  some 
form of  democracy was a prerequisite for anarchist growth, weakening this political 
system before the movement was ready could lead others to exploit the situation. 
 Malatesta, on the other hand, condemned Kropotkin’s position, not sim-
ply from the traditional anarchist position but also because he argued that an allied 
victory would result in a “clerical-nationalist” revival in France, delaying the 
prospects of  a European revolution.15 However, as Carl Levy points out, Malatesta’s 
critique also resulted from his appraisal of  the potential for anarchist revolution: 
anarchism would only be achieved in the longer term. Before this development 
there needed to be a more general socialist revolution which would allow for the 
growth of  anarchist thought among the populace. To create an anarchist society 
“men and women had to be free to practice libertarian lives in the workplace, in 
their families and in their communities, and that would only occur through gener-
ations.”16 The “astonishing and humiliating” way in which workers had lined up to 
defend the bourgeois states only served to prove this point.17 Nonetheless, Malatesta 
felt that the growing opposition to the war did create the potential for this initial 
revolutionary advance and advocated the creation of  a new International that would 
bring together socialists, anarchists, and syndicalists that had remained loyal to their 
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internationalist principle and the class struggle, thereby uniting the war-weary forces 
of  the working class. The International, La Mondiale, was never created.18 Both po-
sitions betrayed the reality that an anarchist revolution was not imminent and that 
it required a period of  preparation under a benevolent or non-interfering form of  
government.  
So in 1917 the anarchist movement was divided and weakened as, despite 
the radicalization of  certain elements of  the working class, the masses chose to fol-
low, although with increasing fatigue, the patriotic logic of  the war. In this context, 
the February Revolution in Russia was a godsend to the anarchists who welcomed 
it with great enthusiasm, perhaps without fully acknowledging the complexity of  
the events it would introduce for Russia, the working-class movement, and revolu-
tionary tactics in general. The revolutionary period brought about by the Russian 
revolution of  1917 would catch the anarchists unprepared, both physically and or-
ganizationally in Russia itself, as well as tactically as shall be seen. 
 
The Russian Revolution of  1917 
This confusion is evident in the position of  Kropotkin himself  who following the 
February Revolution, returned to Russia and called for Russians to unite around 
the Revolutionary government’s efforts to continue the war against Germany. This 
was in spite of  the fact that the majority of  anarchists in Russia had opposed the 
war. Kropotkin’s position was similar to the Mensheviks in that he appeared to ac-
cept the theory of  revolutions as a stage of  development, although the motivating 
forces were not simply economic and the changes that occurred were “dependent 
on prevailing local conditions” rather than some abstract idea on the progress of  
history itself.19 Therefore, the February Revolution was a step towards the creation 
of  a socialist society, but not the last one.  
After 300 years of  Tsarist absolutism, in which ideas could not be freely 
circulated and debated among the workers, it was foolish to think that a workforce 
founded on brutality, repression, and strictly imposed hierarchical leadership would 
immediately be able to understand the complex route to self-emancipation for all. 
In 1920, Kropotkin lamented that the destruction of  a free press and free elections 
by the Bolshevik government made the construction of  a new society impossible.20 
Once again, for anarchism to advance from a rebellious spirit born in reaction to 
tyranny into an ideology that could propose serious and realistic solutions to the 
inequalities and abuses of  capitalist development, it needed to do so in a tolerant 
society. Kropotkin was living proof  of  this dilemma who had to flee Russia to de-
velop his ideas in France and the UK. Yet, his 40 years in exile had also distanced 
him from the reality of  the Russian masses. Kropotkin was “increasingly isolated” 
and his direct influence on events in Russia was limited, in large part owing to de-
liberate Bolshevik policy (he was forced to leave the capital), but also because his 
position did not reflect the revolutionary mood of  the masses who were moving 
away from support of  the Provisional Government from mid to late 1917.21 
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The Bolsheviks were the political force that best represented the increasing 
radicalization of  the workers and peasants and their increasing frustration with bro-
ken promises of  the Provisional Government, especially in relation to the war as 
well as the worsening economic situation. As the influence of  the moderate left-
wing parties, the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR), collapsed, es-
pecially in the industrial cities, Bolshevik power increased with the growing, yet still 
numerically inferior proportion of  anarchists on their side. The basis for growing  
Bolshevik was not simply negative, out of  opposition to the Provincial Government 
or fear of  the Whites, although this was perhaps the key factor for many, but also 
arose from the deliberately vague nature of  the Bolshevik propaganda aimed at the 
workers. This may be seen as a deliberate short-term policy, given what later oc-
curred, by party leaders to win over the workers—the unions were still dominated 
by the Mensheviks and SRs—yet the confusion over Bolshevik policy was not lim-
ited to the anarchists, as within the party ranks there was debate as well. The Bol-
sheviks rode the rising wave of  discontent; they did not create nor initially control 
it. In the countryside the peasants simply seized the land, whilst in the cities the 
workers took control of  the factories. They were not following any party orders.  
Policy lines were not clear, with Bolsheviks at the factory or local level often seeming 
to agree with basic syndicalism as well as anarchist ideals in order to adapt to the 
needs of  the situation. In Russia, Bolshevik tactics confused many anarchists who 
initially supported Lenin against the Provisional Government as they were drawn 
to the Bolsheviks by the logic of  the social and political situation in Russia in 1917. 
Both groups opposed the Provisional Government and sought to expand the rev-
olution through soviets and factory committees because at a basic level there was a 
lot of  overlap in their immediate goals. The support for workers’ control evident 
in Lenin’s April Theses and subsequently in The State and Revolution published in 
1917 eclipsed the insistence on the need for the state, although Lenin assured people 
that this was a necessary short term tool for transition to communism and, unlike 
the bourgeois state, would have no permanent army, police force, or bureaucracy 
ruling over the people.22 Anarchist Emma Goldman summarized the Bolsheviks’ 
position: they “clothed themselves with the agrarian programme of  the Social Rev-
olutionists and the industrial tactics of  the Anarchists. Yet, after the high tide of  
revolutionary enthusiasm had carried them into power, the Bolsheviki discarded their 
false plumes.”23 The Bolsheviks acted to enforce their ideas on the revolution, while 
the anarchists simply waited “for the revolution to eventually lead the way to the 
utopian ideals.”24 Moreover, the Bolsheviks overwhelmingly outnumbered the an-
archists. 
Despite the international importance of  Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin, 
the anarchist movement was late developing in Russia, evolving from factions of  
the narodnik groups of  the 1870s and 1880s. A number of  anarchist groups had 
been active during the failed revolution of  1905. Nonetheless, the movement was 
weak and, given the repressive nature of  the Tsarist regime remained disorganized 
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while the violence associated with the tactic of  the propaganda of  the deed which 
had been rejected by most anarchists in Europe—especially with the rise of  revo-
lutionary syndicalism—was still prevalent. Prior to February 1917, the inability to 
organize either as anarchists or revolutionary syndicalists meant that the libertarian 
movement was exceedingly weak. Before the war, there may have been as few as 
220 anarchists active in the country; however, by 1917, Arshinov claimed there were 
between 30,000 and 40,000.25 According to the anarcho-syndicalist Gregori Maxi-
mov, who was also a leading figure of  the Petrograd Soviet, the revolutionary situ-
ation following the February Revolution, the release of  many anarchist political 
prisoners, and the return of  anarchist emigres from abroad soon led to Russia being 
“covered with a thick, albeit too loosely connected, net of  groups. Scarcely a sizeable 
city did not have an Anarcho-Syndicalist or Anarchist group.”26 This may be so but 
most, if  not all, of  them had Bolshevik groups. The anarchist movement developed 
and evolved quickly, but was unable to overcome this initial backwardness and lack 
of  penetration among the masses. When an All-Russian Federation of  Anarcho-
Communists was eventually formed in early 1918, the Bolshevik consolidation of  
power was already well advanced and it was about to be directed against the anar-
chists. It is not clear how much influence it had among anarchists, not to mention 
the working class as a whole. There was also an All-Russian Confederation of  An-
archo-syndicalists and organizations at the local level. There appeared to be an 
agreement on the need for organization, yet, in general, coordination was lacking 
and anarchists often acted as individuals within the factory committees rather than 
representatives of  any organization. As if  to stress the point, an All-Russian Divi-
sion of  Anarcho-Universalists was set up in the summer of  1920, but at its first 
meeting a split occurred. The anarcho-syndicalist Boris Yelensky lamented that in 
general “there was no coordinated aim or program among the many factions.”27 
Ideological differences continued to weaken the movement; the need for Federa-
tions for both communists and syndicalists is proof  of  this. Although there were 
attempts to create a unified organization, this would be too little too late.  
Yet, a social revolution was evolving around them, from the bottom up, 
expressed in the urban centres by the factory committees and elsewhere, by the cre-
ation of  worker and peasant soviets.  Factory committees took the place of  re-
formist unions and soviets eclipsed parliament.28 Both were organisms that 
defended worker control and self-management—democratically elected by, and di-
rectly accountable to, the workers. An anarchist delegate to the First All-Russian 
Congress of  Trade Unions in January 1918 claimed the committees were “cells of  
the coming socialist order, the order without political power.”29 The Soviet historian 
Anna Pankratova accepted that in the early days of  the revolution “anarchist ten-
dencies were more easily and successfully manifested.”30 This did not mean that an-
archists were dominant or even numerous, but simply that—in the period between 
the revolutions—there was a moment of  flux and confusion in which workers put 
forward basic ideas and imposed policies that could be interpreted as favourable to 
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the anarchist interpretation of  how the revolution should develop. The evolution 
of  the factory committees demonstrated this and illuminated that, in believing the 
worker-led revolution would naturally develop along anarchist lines, anarchists they 
were deluding themselves. 
Factory committees began appearing almost immediately after the Febru-
ary Revolution. By the end of  March, they existed in nearly every factory in Petro-
grad and Moscow. During the revolutionary period, the committees effectively 
replaced or were overseeing the unions, which were weak, and had been heavily in-
filtrated by the police during the Tsarist period.  In Petrograd, a Central Council 
for Factory Committees was created and by October there were some 65 such cen-
tres in the country.31 Anarcho-syndicalists played an important role in the commit-
tees, especially in Kronstadt and Vyborg, and supported the idea of  workers’ control 
put forward by the committees from the beginning. Their rejection of  centralization 
meant that while their views were popular, more credence was given to the Bolshe-
viks whose influence on the committees began to grow. In October, the first All-
Russian Conference of  Factory Committees was held with 66 of  the 137 
representatives being Bolsheviks. As a result, while the anarcho-syndicalists were 
active in factory committees, and their number increased throughout late 1917, they 
were well behind the strength of  the Bolsheviks. Nonetheless, the factory commit-
tees with their bottom-up organizational approach allowed anarchists more influ-
ence than their numbers nationally merited, yet the lack of  a national organization 
on a par with the other socialist groups eventually was a cause of  weakness as the 
committees began to form regional and nationwide organizations. 
The first Conference of  Factory Committees of  Petrograd and its envi-
rons was held in May 1917. The main subject for debate at the meeting concerned 
who should run the factories: the Mensheviks favoured state control while the an-
archo-syndicalists and the Bolsheviks supported worker control. However, what 
workers’ control entailed was not fully clarified; indeed, “the whole subject of  work-
ers’ control in the Russian Revolution is awash in confusion.”32 The Bolshevik trade 
unionist Lozovsky, who later became General Secretary to the Red International 
of  Labour Unions, claimed that “Workers’ control was the fighting slogan of  the 
Bolsheviks before the October days . . . but despite the fact that workers’ control 
figured in all resolutions, and was displayed on all banners, it had an aura of  mystery 
about it.”33 
Initially, the factory committees were more concerned with the basic aim 
“of  limiting economic disruption, maintaining production and preserving jobs.”34 
As the economic crisis worsened throughout 1917, they increased their control over 
factory operations, intervening in every sphere of  management and becoming part 
of  a “counter-state,” but this was largely because of  the conditions and the inef-
fective nature of  the Provisional Government. This is how anarchists foresaw the 
movement should naturally evolve, with the workers released from their shackles 
advancing towards control of  production and transforming the economy and soci-
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ety into a libertarian one. Yet, their belief  was not held by many—as the number 
of  representatives at conferences and congresses showed. Ultimately, the workers 
preferred to trust the Bolsheviks with their future. As Smith has argued in his study 
of  Petrograd, throughout 1917, the Bolsheviks did not initiate nor control the move-
ment instead “it responded to it, trying to steer it in the direction it believed was 
proper.”35 In short, the Bolshevik arguments were more convincing and more di-
rectly relevant to the immediate goals of  the workers themselves. 
Nonetheless, the factory committees were the focus of  anarchist revolu-
tionary hopes, even more so than the soviets where, although anarchists were often 
represented, their influence was minimal in relation to the major parties. The unions 
also proved resistant to anarchism. Following the February Revolution, the union 
movement “quickly became Menshevik-dominated,” and, at the Third Trade Union 
Conference in July 1917, voted overwhelmingly to support the Provisional Gov-
ernment.36 Bolsheviks enjoyed only 36% of  the vote, with the anarchists and syn-
dicalists receiving much less. However, in the summer of  that year, a wave of  strikes 
hit the country demonstrating the growing disillusionment of  the workers with the 
lack of  progress in the issues of  peace, land, and elections promised by the Provi-
sional Government. 
In fact, the immediate objective for most Russians in 1917 was to end the 
war. The desire for revolutionary change and an end to Russian involvement in the 
war was what caused anarchists to unite with the Bolsheviks: allowing themselves 
to believe that Lenin and his vanguard party had become “libertarianized” by the 
social forces around them and would actually give all power to the soviets and work-
ers’ control to the factories. At the third Congress of  Soviets held at the beginning 
of  1918, the Bolshevik leader even stated that in Russia “Anarchist ideas have now 
taken on living form.”37 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the 1917 October Revolution was seen 
by most anarchists as “an authentic revolution, taking its impulse from the bottom 
upward and spontaneously producing the organs of  direct democracy,” one that 
“presented all the characteristics of  a social revolution with libertarian tendencies.”38 
There were at least four anarchists in the revolutionary military committee that 
planned the October 1917 uprising and it was an anarchist who led the soldiers that 
closed down the Constituent Congress in January, 1918. As the Bolsheviks sought 
to consolidate their power and impose their ideas, the anarchists soon realized that 
they had helped create a force that they could not control. 
 
The October Revolution and Its Aftermath 
The creation of  the Council of  People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) in October, 1917 
and the Supreme Council of  the Economy (Vesenkha) in December of  the same 
year heralded a number of  decrees that undermined both the soviets and the factory 
committees. The state and the Bolshevik party controlled the Soviets and the unions, 
which, in turn, controlled the factory committees, hierarchy anathema to the anar-
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chists. The decree on workers’ control passed in November 1917 and awarded the 
committees “extensive but only supervisory rights,” which did not include the right 
to manage the factories (although that was what many of  the committees were ef-
fectively doing at the time).39 The First All-Russian Trade Union Convention, held 
in January 1918, demonstrated how power had shifted since mid-1917. Indeed, 75 
delegates were Bolsheviks, 51 belonged to no party, 20 were Mensheviks, seven 
were left SRs, five were right SRs, and three were anarchists.40  The anarchists made 
much of  the importance of  their role in the committees; in reality, their influence 
was limited and they proved impotent to stop the weakening of  the working-class 
movement under the new Soviet Regime. This was because the Congress agreed 
that “the trade unions must support fully and loyally the policy of  the socialists So-
viet Government directed by the Soviet of  People’s Commissars,” and voted for 
the factory committees to be effectively placed under the control of  the unions.41 
The year 1918 saw the increasing bolshevization of  the workplace, as the whole 
revolutionary economic structure was centralized under the state. With opposition 
to Bolshevik rule in the labour movement effectively outlawed, the Bolsheviks now 
felt safe to move against their revolutionary opponents. From April, 1918 onward-
sthere was increasing opposition from anarchists to the Bolsheviks, in large part 
due to the escalating repression and arrests they faced from the Cheka (the Soviet 
secret police) in December 1917. 
In the months after the October Revolution, it quickly became obvious 
to many anarchists that they had been fooled.42 Having supported the October Rev-
olution, anarchists then found themselves in a quandary over whether to support 
the consolidation of  Bolshevik rule or oppose it along with counterrevolutionaries. 
Anarchist thinking had not been prepared for this and many continued to support 
the revolution by undertaking active roles in soviet and factory committees, con-
vincing themselves that at some point in the future their views would be taken into 
account. Indeed, Skirda speaks of  an “auto-liquidation” of  the anarchist 
movement.43 
As the Bolsheviks increasingly imposed their party line on the revolution-
ary Left that had initially supported them, anarchist resistance became more violent 
and the movement was subjected to further repression.  The Black Guards—mili-
tarized groups of  workers initially set up in the Ukraine as a counterweight to the 
Bolshevik-controlled Red Army—had roughly 50 units active in Moscow with about 
2,000 members and were connected to the Moscow Federation of  Anarchist 
Groups. However, the Bolsheviks had no interest in allowing this growth in anar-
chist influence which was challenging the relatively weak Bolshevik Party in the cap-
ital and in April, 1918 the Cheka launched an attack on the Black Guards 
Headquarters in Moscow, killing some 40 anarchists, as part of  an initial crack-
down.44 In 1919, anarchists and Left SRs in Moscow created the impressively named 
Pan-Russian Insurgent Committee of  Revolutionary Partisans—the Anarchists of  
the Underground, which was able to infiltrate the Cheka temporarily.45 However, 
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the return to terrorist tactics from the Tsarist period only proved that the anarchists 
had effectively lost all hope of  influencing the direction the Soviet Union was taking. 
In November 1919, the Anarchists of  the Underground in Moscow were sur-
rounded by members of  the Cheka and blew themselves up. Similar groups in other 
cities were also soon liquidated. The anti-anarchist repression, including the execu-
tion of  militants, had started, although it would become more widespread from 
1921 onwards. Meanwhile, many Russian anarchists had already begun to look to-
wards the Ukraine where an anarchist-inspired revolution was underway.46 
The situation in the Ukraine was a “kaleidoscopic process... a complex 
pattern of  overlapping revolutions.”47 At different times Germans (the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty awarded the region to the Second Reich), Ukrainian nationalists, Bolsheviks, 
Whites, and anarchists were involved in fighting. Led by the anarchist Nestor 
Makhno, a peasant revolt in the south-east of  the region had developed into a full-
scale social revolutionary movement, with organization based on  a “soviet sys-
tem.”48 The Makhnovschina was not exclusively anarchist: it was “a motley mass 
movement inside which all supporters of  social revolution could co-exist.”49 How-
ever, the influence of  anarchism was clear in its aims and practice: ideologically it 
preached anti-statism, supporting “the complete self-direction of  the working peo-
ples in all their affairs” via “free working councils of  peasants and workers organ-
izations.”50 
Meanwhile, the Confederation of  Anarchist Organizations (Nabat), 
formed in late 1918, brought together the urban anarchists in the Ukraine as well 
as leading Russian anarchists such as Volin (real name Vsevolod Eichenbaum). Volin 
hoped that Nabat would help achieve what he called “united anarchism” by bringing 
together the different anarchist tendencies into one organization.51 According to 
historian Paul Avrich, many syndicalists refused to join because they worried that 
the organization would lead to the domination of  the anarchist movement by an-
archo-communists.52 Nabat’s goal was to spread libertarian ideas among the workers 
and peasants by publishing a newspaper, printing anarchist pamphlets, organizing 
propaganda tours, and maintaining contact with anarchist groups in other countries. 
It was based on groups or circles rather than individuals and any decision had to be 
agreed upon by the group. Groups then formed regional or urban federations, with 
each group electing a delegate to the federations’ soviets. Nabat began to send mil-
itants to Gulyai-Polye, the centre of  the Makhnovschina. However, anarchists that 
were attracted to the Ukraine from other regions had a limited effect on the 
Makhnovists, the only exception being Peter Arshinov (sometimes spelt Archinov), 
who had shared a prison cell with Makhno before the 1917 revolutions. The two 
determined the ideology of  the evolving movement along libertarian lines with the 
aim of  building “a genuine Soviet structure in which the soviets, chosen by the 
workers will be the servants of  the people, executing the laws and decrees that the 
workers themselves will write.”53 Worn down by the constant fighting with different 
factions, once the counterrevolutionary threat to Moscow waned, the Makhnovists 
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became victims of  their erstwhile allies. In 1921 the movement was finally sup-
pressed by the Bolsheviks and the majority of  the leading members were executed. 
The Ukrainian revolution, the one event anarchists could look on with pride in the 
Russian revolution, would have a great influence on the international movement 
over the next ten years as prominent members of  the Makhnovschina including 
Volin, Arshinov, and Makhno himself, escaped into exile, ending up in Paris by the 
mid-1920s where they made contact with French and other exile groups including 
the Italians and Spanish.  
Nonetheless, what lessons the anarchists of  Western Europe could learn— 
even in the more agrarian regions of  the South—from a revolutionary-military 
movement and organized peasant rebellion, was not immediately apparent. The re-
bellion aligned with the romantic anarcho-communist vision of  peasant rebellion, 
but was not easily transferable to industrializing societies. One relevant factor that 
was omitted was the Makhnovschina nationalist character; indeed, not only were 
they fighting against the Tsar, the Whites, and the Bolsheviks, they were also fighting 
to free Ukraine from Russian imperialism. Parallels with Catalonia are obvious 
whereas, in Italy, the anarchist movement was stronger in some regions than oth-
ers—a localized or regional rejection of  a centralized government may strengthen 
a movement based on decentralization and federalism such as anarchism. At the 
same time, it may also limit the growth of  a truly national movement that can chal-
lenge the nation state. Once the Bolsheviks had consolidated power elsewhere, they 
easily defeated the Makhnovists. By 1922, throughout Russia, their unions had been 
closed down and anarchists had been imprisoned, forced into exile, or killed by the 
Cheka. Some anarchists, the so-called anarcho-Bolsheviks, converted to Bolshevism, 
accepting that the revolution required a dictatorial transition period, or at least saw 
no alternative given the situation. Anarchism in Russia had failed. 
Following the failure of  anarchism to take hold, a comprehensive anarchist 
appraisal of  where things had gone wrong in Russia immediately began. Goldman, 
Berkman, and Gorelik focused their critique on the nature of  Bolshevik power and 
its violent repression of  the Russian anarchist movement, an argument given weight 
by Maximoff ’s book The Guillotine at work.54 Kropotkin concluded: “we are learning 
to know in Russia how not to introduce communism,” yet anarchists were still far 
from providing their own solution to this problem beyond utopian rhetoric.55 
Arshinov, Makhno, and other exiles formed the Dielo Trouda group in 
Paris, which began publication of  an eponymous journal in 1925 before launching 
the Platform. The Platform was a program for anarchist action in 1926 and pointed 
the finger at the Russian anarchists’ lack of  organization and unity. The Platform 
began with an analysis of  the Russian anarchists’ failure:  
 
it was during the Russian revolution of  1917 that the need 
for a general organization was felt most acutely, since it was 
during the course of  that revolution that the anarchist move-
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ment displayed the greatest degree of  fragmentation and con-
fusion. The absence of  a general organization induced many 
anarchist militants to defect to the ranks of  the Bolsheviks.56 
 
The lack of  effective organization resulted from the numerous internal squabbles 
in the movement.57  Although not supporting the organizational aspects of  the Plat-
form, Maximoff  agreed with their critique of  the lack of  organization. Volin, as we 
have seen, had tried to mold the Nabat into a unified anarchist organization (a proj-
ect he would try to continue from exile in France under the name of  Synthesis), 
but was unable to do so. As a result, there was mistrust between the anarcho-syn-
dicalists who were seen as “anarcho-bureaucrats” influenced by a westernized ide-
ology (syndicalism), the anarcho-communists, many of  whom lived in the past, and 
supported the creation of  communes along similar lines to the Narodniki (Populists) 
in the nineteenth century, and the anarcho-individualists who were accused of  not 
being sufficiently involved in revolutionary activity. 58 The anarcho-Bolsheviks only 
added to the confusion. 
The disparate anarchist factions worked apart, their inability to create a 
common front limiting their ability to influence, educate and therefore prepare the 
masses in a context where other revolutionary political groups had no qualms about 
directing the masses themselves. There was much wishful thinking and exaggeration 
of  the anarchist nature of  the initial period of  the Russian Revolution in 1917 and 
the needs and goals of  the masses. The anarchists were revolutionaries and had 
talked, written, and debated about the need for revolution for decades; however, as 
events in Russia had demonstrated, they had not developed a clear revolutionary 
policy. The traditional anarchist concept of  revolution, based on faith in the spon-
taneous action of  the masses and their ability to construct the new society as an al-
most natural occurrence, clearly would not work in these circumstances:  
 
it is not enough just for the masses to embark on the road to 
social revolution. It must also be ensured that the revolution 
holds true to its path and objective—the overthrow of  capi-
talist society in the name of  the society of  free workers. As 
the experience of  the Russian revolution of  1917 has shown 
us, this is no easy task, mainly because of  the many parties 
attempting to steer the movement in the opposite direction 
to that of  social revolution.59 
 
In short, anarchists needed to “find ways of  withstanding intense reactionary ag-
gression and of  sustaining the revolutionary forces during periods of  fighting.”60 
Improving organization was not simply as a means of  better coordination 
for the revolution when it came, but also a means to facilitate spreading their ideals 
among the masses who would be the conduit of  any social change. However, or-
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ganizing the different tendencies within the anarchist movement and agreeing on 
tactics, especially in relation to the masses enshrined in the Labour movement, had 
not proved possible. Although anarchism grew rapidly during the revolutionary pe-
riod, it was unable to catch up with the better organized Bolsheviks. Moreover, 
whereas the Bolsheviks had a clear program to present to the workers, the anarchists 
did not have a program at all. The soviets and the factory councils would serve as 
inspirations for anarchists abroad, yet they had easily been subdued by the Bolshevik 
state. In general, the labour movement had “had sufficient strength to overthrow 
the old regime, in many of  its forms, but they lacked the strength to build their own 
alternative reality”—the strength, or perhaps the will or the knowledge.61  In Russia, 
it appeared to be all three. There were not enough anarchists to influence events, 
while “the attractiveness of  the Bolshevik political platform,” the promises of  
“Peace, Land and Bread!” and “All power to the Soviets,” and “the party’s carefully 
nurtured links with the revolutionary workers” gained Bolsheviks the support that 
anarchists felt should have been theirs.62 The Russian anarchists had been out-
smarted and out-maneuvered and never really threatened to stand in Lenin’s path. 
Outside Russia, anarchist reaction to the October Revolution followed a 
remarkably similar pattern in the different nationalist and regional anarchist organ-
izations.63 To simplify, reactions passed through three phases although the difficulties 
in receiving reliable information about the events in Russia make it hard to pinpoint 
the time that any specific shift took place.64 Initially, militants of  all persuasions wel-
comed the Bolshevik seizure of  power enthusiastically, but this support became in-
creasingly qualified from late 1918 as more information became available about the 
exact nature of  Bolshevism.  The final phase began in late 1920, when the formation 
of  national communist parties and debate about the Third International and its 
union adjunct, the Profintern, brought the true nature of  the ideological conflict 
to light. However, the reaction to events in Russia is not the focus of  this article, 
but the evolution of  anarchist thinking on the matter is an important backdrop to 
the revolutionary movements in Spain and Italy. 
 
Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Spanish Trienio Bolchevique 
In Spain, anarchists’ initial reaction to the October Revolution was overwhelmingly 
positive as in other countries. Significantly, news of  events in Russia arrived in Spain 
at a time of  growing social tension, creating a potentially revolutionary situation 
largely as a consequence of  the rapid industrialization which occurred during the 
First World War. Despite Spain being neutral in the global conflict, its social and 
economic structure was drastically affected by the phenomenal demands its indus-
tries received from both belligerent countries and those countries that they had pre-
viously supplied.65 The rapid rise in industrial output brought with it a concomitant 
rise in union strength. Membership of  the CNT had been, until then, relatively in-
significant, but it now grew from 15,000 in 1916 to 714,028 in 1919.66 A taste of  
what was to follow had been provided by the unsuccessful general strike of  August, 
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1917. For the next three years, Spain was gripped by a spectacular upsurge in social 
unrest and agitation in both industrializing and rural areas, which resulted in a rapid 
expansion in CNT membership with anarchists playing a prominent role.  
At a National Congress in December 1919, the CNT provisionally joined 
the Comintern. Events in Russia had little to do with the causes of  the unrest, but 
they did provide a positive spur to the workers. The period 1918-1920 was labeled 
Trienio Bolchevique by the historian Diaz de Moral, although, as has been pointed 
out, the period “wasn’t three years nor Bolshevik.”67 In reality, the period saw a wave 
of  strikes—including general strikes—as the working class flexed its newly devel-
oped muscles, along with rising violence and revolt in the countryside, especially in 
Andalusia. The strength of  the CNT, and the anarchist movement in general, was 
not well distributed nationally, being centralized in Cataluña (of  the 433,746 CNT 
members represented at the CNT’s December 1919 National Congress in Madrid, 
251,987 came from Barcelona).68 Elsewhere, apart from Andalusia and, to a lesser 
extent, Valencia, Aragon, Asturias, and Galicia, the movement did not have the 
strength to lead, or even to organize, a revolutionary movement. Revolution may 
have been in the pages of  anarchist and confederal newspapers, but, in reality, the 
majority of  strikes were over concrete demands for better pay, improved working 
conditions, and the eight-hour work day. Strikes in support of  laid-off  colleagues 
were also common. Despite being initially caught on the defensive, the regional and 
national government, in tandem with the Employers’ Federations, soon re-estab-
lished control. The social tension and subsequent repression created an environment 
of  conflict but there was no collapse of  state and military power as in Russia, or 
serious revolutionary attempts to take power. The failure of  the strike movement 
to evolve into a revolution would result in acrimonious debate within the anarchist 
movement in Spain during the 1920s.  
Spanish anarchist organization outside the unions was still limited to a 
local level and took place primarily in the press. In the press different affinity groups 
spoke of  the need to organize “all Spanish Anarchists,” although the general argu-
ment was that this should start at a local level and then move to a regional level.69 
In mid-December, 1918, a national anarchist conference was held in Barcelona. Ac-
cording to Manuel Buenacasa, who had been General Secretary of  the CNT earlier 
in the year, the conference recommended that all libertarian workers in Spain should 
“enter and participate directly and immediately in the labor unions.”70 Most anar-
chists were workers and already members of  the CNT therefore the recommenda-
tion seemed to be self-evident. It also depended on what was understood by 
“participate directly.” Should they act as workers supporting workers’ day-to-day 
demands, for eample organizing strikes, or should they look to create a revolutionary 
spirit in the workers and try to push the movement towards a revolutionary end? 
Significantly, the conference was held just after a Congress in Sans (Barcelona) re-
launched the Catalan Regional Confederation (CRT), at which it was agreed that 
while the CRT viewed anarchism “with sympathy,” anarchists were not to “directly 
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intervene in the affairs of  the unions” and should “work outside the unions in favor 
of  the emancipation of  the working class.”71 
The potential conflict over this position was momentarily put aside as the 
reorganized CRT and the CNT launched a series of  strikes, the largest of  which 
was at the Ebro Irrigation and Power Company (known locally as the Canadiense) 
in Lerida which quickly spread to Barcelona in 1919. What started as a protest over 
the firing of  some workers developed into a general strike that left Barcelona with-
out electricity for 44 days, resulting in the authorities forcing the company to accept 
the CNT’s demands including a pay raise; while in an attempt to avoid further such 
strikes spreading, the government legalized the eight-hour working day in the fac-
tories.72 La Canadiense was the most successful strike of  the postwar period in Spain 
and “marked the pinnacle of  CNT strength prior to the Spanish Civil War.”73 The 
strike would show both the potential of  the CNT and its weaknesses. In its initial 
stages, the strike “frightened bourgeois opinion” not because of  “the violence of  
the strike (never in a major strike had violence been kept so under control), nor any 
supposedly revolutionary demands … but the ordered and disciplined strength of  
the trade unions.”74 The fear of  the union’s growing strength would lead to a fierce 
backlash by employers with the help of  the local military. The authorities in Cat-
alonia reneged on the agreement to release a number of  strikers who had been de-
tained during the strike, and the CNT declared a new general strike. The military, 
combined with the Somatén (a right-wing paramilitary group) and gunmen in the 
pay of  the employers’ federation, then launched a fierce campaign against the union. 
In an attempt to negotiate a resolution, CNT leaders became involved in a state-
created mixed commission but with little success. The failure of  the strike and the 
acceptance of  a form of  state arbitration via the mixed commission along with ar-
guments by confederal leaders such as Pestaña and Seguí, led to calls that syndicalist 
policies needed to dominate in the unions as well as increased criticism of  the CNT 
leadership from radical anarchists. A manifesto by the Catalan Federation of  Anar-
chist Groups in December 1919 argued that “Syndicalism—a means of  struggle 
based on direct action—ends with the implantation of  libertarian communism ... 
Syndicalism as a goal in itself, is nothing.” They warned it was a tactic of  anarchist 
revolutionary policy, and that under the leadership of  “pure syndicalists” who 
tended to be interested only in the economic struggle, “the abyss of  corporatism 
or of  reformism awaits the unions.”75 
In an effort to paste over the growing divisions at its National Congress 
held in Madrid in December 1919, the CNT passed a resolution adopting libertarian 
communism (anarchism) as its ultimate goal—although exactly what the Confed-
eration understood by the term would not be clarified until 1936.76 The Congress 
also debated the CNT’s membership of  the Communist International, adopting a 
cautious position of  provisional affiliation while waiting to see what principles it 
would be modeled up on. At the same time, the Congress made clear that it was “a 
firm defender of  the principle that guided the First International, as conceived by 
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Bakunin”—thus, clearly not endorsing Bolshevism.77 The main debate at the Con-
gress was over a possible merger with the socialist Union General de Trabajadores 
(UGT) which would unite the Spanish working class in one strong movement. Ul-
timately, the radical position demanding that UGT members abandon the UGT for 
the CNT won the day, making unification impossible. In general, the debates in the 
Congress demonstrated the “enormous eclecticism” in CNT ranks.78 This issue 
must be borne in mind as we look at the debate concerning the anarchist position 
in relation to syndicalism in Spain—there were not simply two well defined posi-
tions, that of  the radical anarchists or that of  the anarcho-syndicalists. Many found 
themselves in the middle supporting one side on some issues and the otherside on 
others, with a number seeming to support both. It would be misleading to simply 
equate the radical anarchist position with that of  the anarcho-communists in Rus-
sia—they were directly involved in the union movement but used the unions as a 
tool or weapon to achieve revolution, believing and their principle funtion action 
should be to inspire and provoke revolution.79 Nevertheless, positions evolved over 
time in relation to events and were also influenced by regional issues, a factor of  
particular importance in Catalonia where over half  the CNT membership lived. In 
the short term,  debate continued between 1919 and 1922, although the attempt by 
a small faction of  pro-Moscow syndicalists to take over the CNT caused a diversion 
that temporarily united the different factions.80 As the strike movement stagnated 
in the face of  government and employer opposition, many anarchists started to 
blame the weakening of  the workers’ resolve on syndicalism’s focus on achieving 
concrete economic goals rather than pressing for a revolutionary change. 
After a change in government in March 1922, constitutional guarantees 
were restored and the persecution of  the Confederation eased but did not disappear. 
The first national meeting of  leading CNT delegates since 1919 was held in 
Zaragoza in June 1922. The Zaragoza conference witnessed the defeat of  the small 
pro-Moscow faction and the CNT’s withdrawal from the Profintern. The confer-
ence also passed a resolution protesting against the repression of  anarchists and 
syndicalists in Russia. Following the Russian debates, the Conference allowed an 
initial appraisal of  the recent strike movement to be carried out. The national com-
mittee accepted that the CNT was suffering a “moral crisis” owing to the lack of  a 
united position and that it was “indisputable that errors, confusion and, possibly 
fundamental deviations” had “corroded the essence of  revolutionary syndicalism.”81 
To overcome these problems, prominent members of  the Committee put forward 
a “political motion” which the conference adopted unanimously. The motion argued 
that the CNT had to involve itself  in the politics of  the nation, not politics as de-
fined by the other political parties, but politics in general, all issues that affected the 
lives Confederation members.82 
However, the political motion would only deepen the conflict between 
radical and syndicalist anarchists now both unrestrained by their alliance against the 
pro-Moscow faction.  For the radicals the unions, and syndicalism in general, were 
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merely a means of  achieving their goals, providing the force necessary to challenge 
capitalism and an environment in which to propagate anarchist principles.83 They 
worried that the union leaders, armed with the Zaragoza “political motion” would 
divert the CNT from its revolutionary objectives and entre into negotiations with 
the state. Moreover, there was a fear of  the growing “syndicalization” of  anarchist 
militants in the CNT: “The union is a means, better than others perhaps, where an-
archism can be enacted and if  it is successful ... the union becomes an element of  
libertarian action and emancipation. However, when the syndical environment, with 
all its vices, absorbs the anarchist personality, it becomes an obstacle to the realiza-
tion of  the ideal.”84 
The Spanish anarchists were finally able to hold a National Congress in 
Madrid in March 1923. The Congress had ten items on the agenda, including or-
ganization (local, regional, and national) and the anarchist position in relation to 
syndicalism.85 National organization was limited to the creation of  a Committee of  
Anarchist Relations rather than a national federation because it was judged to be 
more important that members should seek to influence actions in their own regions 
by acting within their specific “affinity groups.” The use of  “affinity groups” would 
help maintain their freedom of  activity and would allow them to act voluntarily 
rather than through the direction of  a national body.86 The National Committee of  
Anarchist Relations (and the various regional committees) would co-ordinate, but 
not direct, anarchist activity across regional and local borders.87 The Congress sup-
ported the need to prepare workers for revolution, yet radical anarchists almost im-
mediately tried to launch the movement into revolutionary action. In July, the 
National Committee and its Catalan counterpart declared that, since the anarchist 
ideal had been made clear, it was now necessary to make it a reality “and to do this 
only required one thing: revolution.”  Anarchists had to provoke the revolution: 
“we must be men and free men once and for all.”88 Either too little time had been 
allocated to undertake the educational tasks required or not enough had been learnt 
as revolutionary policy seemed as spontaneous and unplanned as ever.  
The Committee’s first manifesto, “Anarchists and the present movement”, 
appeared to be a battle-cry for anarchists involved in the ongoing transport strike 
in Barcelona.89 The transport strike was simply one of  a series of  labour protests 
occurring during the Summer of  1923 which left the workers exhausted, the unions 
penniless, and the CNT more divided than ever. Information regarding the events 
is sparse, contradictory, and a little confusing, but what is clear is the dominant role 
of  anarchists in the social unrest and the growing distance between radicals, led by 
a faction labelled “anarcho-bolshevik,” and the increasingly exasperated leaders of  
the CNT.90 Organized in affinity groups (although not all affinity groups were rad-
ical), the main one being Los Solidarios, the anarcho-bolsheviks claimed that the 
bourgeoisie was on the brink of  collapse and that now was the time for revolution. 
They tried to get CNT support for assaults on banks and other financial institutions 
in order to buy guns so they could be in a position to bring about the revolution or 
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resist a possible military coup.91 The social violence that accompanied the strike was 
one of  the excuses used by Primo de Rivera to justify his pronunciamiento of  Sep-
tember 13, 1923. Soon after the pronunciamiento, functioning of  the CNT and the 
anarchist local and regional organizations was made impossible by government leg-
islation as press censorship ramped up, resulting in the national Committee of  Re-
lations established in 1923 having to go into exile in France.92 
The de Rivera dictatorship would lead to much debate and division within 
anarchist ranks over why the revolutionary surge of  the immediate postwar period 
had collapsed and the lessons to be learned. Much of  this related to internal issues 
but similarities with events and outcomes in other countries are evident. Within 
Spain there was acrimonious debate about the relationship between syndicalism and 
anarchism—radical anarchists blamed the influence of  syndicalism and the apparent 
lack of  anarchist penetration of  the unions and the workers’ mindset suggesting 
that the solution was to return to a more “purist” interpretation of  anarchism (i.e. 
divested of  the Marxist elements introduced by syndicalism). Syndicalism, lacking 
a clear ideology, led the workers to negotiate and work with the state to achieve 
only minimum goals, turning them into reformists.93 Others blamed the failure on 
the radical anarchists’ attempts to control the labour movement and enforce an un-
realistic revolutionary policy that had little or no chance of  success.94 The lack of  
an independent anarchist organization outside the unions meant that divisions 
among anarchists were felt with greater intensity. These debates have been examined 
in detail by Elorza and Garner, among others, as part of  the process leading to the 
creation of  the Federación Anarquista Ibérica in 1927.95 It was precisely an organ-
ization where debates on the relationship with the labour movement could take 
place outside the unions that was lacking in the period from 1917-1923. The expe-
rience of  1919-23 showed that merely saying that the CNT was the national anar-
chist organization caused division and confusion within unions.  
At its National Congress in Madrid in 1919, the CNT had declared that 
its ultimate goal was the implementation of  libertarian communism, although it had 
never clarified exactly what this meant. Contrary to apperances, the anarchist mes-
sage was in many ways subtler and more complex than that of  the Socialists, de-
manding more active input and sacrifice from the masses as well as at an individual 
level. Indeed, there was a larger focus on the masses as individuals, to destroy ex-
isting society and create a new one. As Orobón Fernández argued, however, the so-
ciety that this sacrifice would create was ill-defined—the message was weak and 
needed greater explanation.96 The anarchist movement was strong and was in some 
regions the main ideological influence in the labour movement, but even in Cataluña 
the strike movement never developed into a revolutionary process that could 
threaten the Spanish state. How could a revolution be carried out on a local or re-
gional basis when in many areas of  Spain the movement had little influence, and 
the Socialist party and its unions had a far greater hold over the working classes? 
The Socialist message of  gradual change through moderate reform appeared to be 
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advancing as well. In fact, the Socialists would work closely with the de Rivera dic-
tatorship and offered a less confrontational and risky path than the “all or nothing” 
radical anarchist approach. The strength of  the movement in Cataluña led militant 
anarchists to overstate the power of  the movement nationally and, as a result, reject 
any idea of  collaboration or negotiation with other labour movements, as had oc-
curred at the 1919 Madrid Congress. In short, despite the relevant strength of  the 
movement, it suffered from a lack of  ideological penetration among a sufficient 
section of  the working class, a shortfall exacerbated by regional differences. Fur-
thermore, as would be argued in following years by a number of  militants, praxis 
and theory were often contradictory:  anarchists spoke of  the need to educate and 
prepare the working masses for revolution only to immediately launch themselves 
into revolutionary conflict whenever possible. Acting like men “once and for all” 
did not make up for the lack of  realism and preparation.97 
 
The Italian Biennio Rosso  
Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship came a year after Mussolini had put an end to the 
democratic regime in Italy in 1922. Italy had a vibrant anarchist movement which 
included militants such as Errico Malatesta and Luigi Fabbri, whose articles were 
widely published in the libertarian press globally. Nonetheless, prior to the war much 
of  the Italian movement could be found outside Italy, in France, England, the USA, 
or Latin America. The anarchist movement grew exponentially in the immediate 
postwar period and the anarcho-individualist tendency was weakened as “ethical in-
dividualism gave way to organizational efforts.”98 The Unione Comunista Anarchica 
(UCA) was created in 1919 at a conference in Florence, changing its name to Unione 
Anarchica Italiana (UAI) a year later.  In 1920 the UAI, together with the anarchist 
affinity groups in Italy, had 20,000 members and membership of  the revolutionary 
syndicalist Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI) was between 300,000 and 500,000, al-
though their popularity still lagged far behind the Socialist Party (250,000) and the 
Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL) with two million members.99 As in 
Spain from 1917 to the end of  1920, the libertarians’ internationalism led them to 
believe in the possibility of  revolution in Italy—especially during the Biennio Rosso 
period (1919-1920) of  intense social unrest in Italy. There was no revolution, but 
the social unrest did have clear “revolutionary traits,” which led the anarchists, as 
well as other revolutionary socialists, to believe they were witnessing a possible pre-
revolutionary period on par with Russia in the period between the 1917 revolu-
tions.100 
The UAI was a federation of  autonomous groups that worked together 
on issues concerning propaganda and the implementation of  a freely accepted pro-
gram. A corresponding commission existed between Congresses to help relations 
between groups, but it had no authority. Groups and individual anarchists could 
make contact with each other directly and were free to carry out any action they 
wished as long as these were in line with the general program.101 However, the Union 
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tried, as Volin had proposed in Russia, to “synthesize” the different currents in one 
homogenous group, a task that was only in its “embryonic stage” as the social unrest 
reached its height.102 The organization became larger, but less coherent. 
Some anarchists were also members of  the CGL and many were members 
of  the revolutionary syndicalist trade union, the USI, which, like the CNT, had been 
created before the war. Malatesta was the leading figure in the UAI, and was re-
sponsible for the anarchist Union’s program adopted at the Bologna Congress in 
1920. The Congress resolution on the subject focused particularly on the role of  
the factory committees, which were seen as “suitable organisms to accommodate, 
with the revolution, all producers … in their workplace, to achieve anarcho-com-
munist principles.”103 As in Russia, the factory committees were important as they 
provided a means of  anarchist influence in the workers’ movement beyond that 
which their numbers merited. As well as organizing strikes, they could be used to 
organize production and distribution following the revolution. The Congress mo-
tion argued that the most important issue in “the revolutionaries’ minds is food,” 
and, therefore, if  the revolution could not ensure the basic need of  the population 
it had little hope of  success.104  As in other countries, the initial interpretation in 
Italy of  events in Russia was favorable, and this libertarian interpretation of  events 
permeated Italian anarchists’ thinking: a “sovietist interpretation of  the Bolshevik 
Revolution seemed to be a confirmation of  the decentralized and direct action 
methods of  anarchists and syndicalists.”105  The introduction to the report on work-
ers’ organizations, written by Luigi Fabbri, stressed the need to “let workers’ organ-
izations and political organizations remain independent of  each other” and to 
“occupy ourselves with the work of  anarchist comrades (within the unions) to en-
sure that they increasingly promote revolutionary and libertarian goals.”106 
Anarchists were actively involved in the factory occupations of  September 
1920 and in the factory committees during the strikes of  1919-1920, but proved 
more successful at starting the agitation than directing it towards any clear goal. 
Malatesta tried to clarify the anarchist position:  
 
We do not want to get into power, neither do we want anyone 
else to do so [and therefore] after contributing to overthrow-
ing the present regime, our task is to prevent, or try to prevent 
a new government from arising … If  we cannot prevent gov-
ernments from existing and being established due to our lack 
of  strength … we strive … to make such governments as 
weak as possible.107  
 
Again, a lot of  sacrifices were asked for without providing a clear plan of  what they 
were for. How would making the government as weak as possible improve the work-
ers’ situation? What would the future look like? How would it be constituted to 
avoid suffering, hunger, and chaos? The Socialists, and the soon-to-be-formed Com-
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munist Party (in January, 1921) had more immediate answers to these questions.  
The anarchist answers existed, but were vague. In Italy, there was a recog-
nition of  the need for organizational duality, with anarchist organization alongside 
labour movement organizations for a clear policy on what the relationship between 
the two movements should be, and for an organism within the unions—the factory 
committees—that would increase anarchist influence. Factory committees also 
worked towards preparing for revolutionary action and the administration of  pro-
duction during the process to ensure the basic needs of  all. Malatesta had previously 
rejected syndicalist faith in the concept of  the general strike to bring about revolu-
tion because of  to the ability of  the factory owners to survive a lack of  productivity 
much longer than the workers could survive a loss of  wages. He now urged the 
workers not to simply occupy the factories, but to organize trade with each other, 
to maintain productivity and begin the transition towards a worker-dominated econ-
omy.108 In Italy, anarchists had created a structure and a plan for revolutionary, action 
although limitations and divisions meant that putting it into practice proved to be 
unrealistic.   
Political scientist Carl Levy suggests there were three main reasons for the 
failure of  anarchist revolutionary policy in Italy: their “uneven national representa-
tion (as in Spain anarchism was far stronger in some regions than others), lack of  
solid institutions, and internal squabbling.”109 The general similarities with Spain are 
clear. Levy goes even further with questions that go to the heart of  the anarchist 
doctrine: “anarchism could never guarantee state patronage and possible industrial 
and land reforms.” Italy was a constitutional liberal state providing alternative paths 
towards the reforms many of  the workers desired which were less violent and ap-
peared more clearly attainable, specifically, social democracy. As had been seen in 
Britain, where the trade unions were at the heart of  the labour movement, “class 
consciousness was directed not towards the destruction of  the capitalist state, but 
towards the integration of  the working class within it.”110 The 1918 November Rev-
olution, and the subsequent role of  the SPD in Germany, of  the Cartel de Gauch 
government in France, and of  the minority government of  Ramsay MacDonald’s 
Labour Party in the United Kingdom provide ample evidence. In Italy and Spain, 
anarchist support was limited and regionalized, with areas where the gradualist and 
orthodox Marxism of  the Spanish and Italian Socialists was a clear obstacle to rev-
olution. 
The socialist position towards the factory occupations was sympathetic, 
but socialists did not endorse them as they were committed to evolution, not to 
revolution. Without their support, the movement was marginalized and abruptly 
ran out of  steam.111 Anarchists had been outnumbered; they had been at the fore-
front of  the movement and had willed the workers to take control of  the factories 
and push the revolutionary movement forward, yet, the workers obeyed the socialist 
leaders and abandoned the factories.  By October, 1920, with the factories now 
evacuated, the government moved in on the Italian anarchists, arresting the leader-
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ship of  both the UAI and the USI. With the rise of  fascism anarchists found it im-
possible to operate as they were imprisoned, murdered, or forced into exile.112 
The resolutions of  the UAI Congress held in Ancona in November 1921 
focused on the lack of  ideological influences among the masses and the concomi-
tant domination of  the Socialists as well as the rejection of  Bolshevik Communism. 
Moreover, the congress accepted the need to organize anarchists’ forces in general 
so as to improve the propagation of  anarchist ideals among the masses. Anarchists 
active in the socialist CGL were to create “internal nuclei” of  anarchist action and 
propaganda, while anarchists had to find ways to “influence the masses of  the dif-
ferent parties” (clearly aimed at the Socialist and the recently created Communist 
parties), and maintain “cordial relations” with them, especially the younger members 
and the workers. All this was done in an attempt to facilitate an “improved diffusion 
of  [anarchist] ideas.”113 
This need to clarify and improve the dissemination of  the anarchist mes-
sage was an argument repeated in the reflections of  the central figures of  Italian 
anarchism including Malatesta, Luigi Fabbri, and Armando Borghi—the former in 
prison and the latter two in exile after the rise of  fascism. The participation of  an-
archists in the labour unrest was more evident than the influence of  their ideas.114 
Anarchists were good at initiating revolutionary action, but their proposals for the 
future, even the immediate future, were not convincing enough for the masses to 
follow them throughout the revolutionary period. Malatesta complained that “we 
anarchists fell well short of  having the sort of  strength needed to make the revolu-
tion using only our own methods and men; we needed the masses and though they 
were ready for action, they were not anarchist.”115 Once again, in relation to socialists 
and communists,  anarchists “lacked a practical program capable of  being enacted 
the day after the victorious revolution.”116 And that is perhaps why the Biennio 
Rosso was “more the end of  a dream than the beginning of  a revolution.”117 The 
Italian anarchist Molaschi reflected after the collapse of  the factory occupations 
that “It is not enough to create rebels and then leave them to their blind instincts: 
we anarchists need to give the workers consciousness, faith and skills. They need to 
know what they want and where to go.”118 This criticism seems valid for the three 
situations we have looked at.  
 
Conclusion 
The three situations studied, each with their own idiosyncrasies—in relation to the 
national situation and the nature of  their anarchist movement—provide a clear pic-
ture of  the main difficulties anarchism as a revolutionary movement faced. Ques-
tions of  organization were central, not simply for the necessities of  the 
revolutionary action itself, but for the propagation and clarification of  anarchist 
tactics and goals (both in the long and short term). Anarchists appeared ill-prepared 
and ill-disposed to direct the masses, seemingly hoping to lead by example. Anarchist 
actions gained support, but the theories penetrated less, especially in relation to Bol-
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shevism in Russia and Socialism in Italy. Internal divisions or confusion resulted. 
The ability of  the Bolsheviks to attract anarchist support should in itself  be seen as 
the result of  a lack of  organization and a clear message. In Italy, too, a larger and 
more organized movement was still ill-prepared to direct the labour movement and 
was dwarfed by its socialist opponents, whose hold on the labour masses steered 
them down a non-revolutionary path and put an end to the factory occupations. In 
Spain, the country with the largest anarchist movement, the internal ideological 
struggle was all the fiercer, taking place in the union movement itself. The relative 
ease with which the factory committees and the labour movement in general in Rus-
sia were undermined, the factory occupation in Italy abandoned, and the union 
movement in Spain repressed all attest to the weakness of  the movement and its 
inability to create a revolutionary force that could realistically enforce revolutionary 
change.  This required strength, organization, and a clear understanding of  why, 
how, and what kind of  change was needed. 
The criticism of  events in Russia, Italy, and Spain focused mainly on im-
mediate tactics such as the need to organize anarchist forces better, predominantly 
to be able to convey to the workers what anarchists wanted and how to accomplish 
it as well as whether the ideological preparation for the revolution was achievable 
in the short term or not. Similarly, Kropotkin pointed to the need to extend the 
ideological sophistication of  anarchist organizations. This sophistication needed 
time, yet rash—and sometimes unplanned—actions provoked repression.  As the 
Russian anarchists of  the Platform, Malatesta in Italy, and Peiró, Pestaña, and 
Orobón Fernández in Spain (not to mention many other lesser-known figures in 
the contemporary anarchist press) argued, this ideological sophistication had not 
been achieved and the workers had fallen victim to other political factions—Bol-
shevik, socialist, or syndicalist—who weakened or hijacked their revolutionary fer-
vour. Anarchism had found itself  in a dilemma, for its revolutionary praxis to 
succeed it needed the strength provided by the labour movement which was based 
on the logic of  class, not ideology, and with in which various other ideologies jostled 
for influence. Yet dependence on the labour movement diluted the libertarian nature 
of  the struggle and meant collaboration with, or at the very least acceptance of, 
other ideological tendencies which could weaken the revolutionary anarchist praxis.   
An anarchist revolution had to be internalized before it could be exterior-
ized: the labour movement needed to have anarchist ideology as its inspiration and 
could not simply be the force that carried out the revolution. Revolution needed 
time for preparation and training and, consequently, the political structure for these 
activities to take place. If  this did not exist, anarchism would simply be a romantic, 
moral, and philosophical movement against oppression but would lack the clarity 
to bring about action to put an end to oppression in order to create a fairer society. 
Organization was needed to communicate anarchist ideology clearly to the working 
masses, as was a more active leadership role during any revolutionary situation to 
manage the transition period. After the revolution, it would also be vital to provide 
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a coherent and credible explanation of  how basic services and necessities would be 
maintained rather than propagating generalized Utopian vision—such a vision might 
have served in pre-revolutionary times, but would be too vague once the revolu-
tionary situation had arrived which would allow other political groups with more 
concrete ideas (or, indeed, propaganda) to take the initiative.  
In this way, Anarchists were unprepared for revolution, having not taken 
the time either to educate the working masses sufficiently in their ideology or to 
plan for the aftermath. Inspired by events in Russia and supported by revolutionary 
socialists, they threw themselves with vigour into situations of  social unrest, seeing 
revolution within reach. All too often the postwar anarchist movement is seen as 
having been in a struggle with Bolshevism, yet it was the inability of  both radical 
ideologies to “revolutionize” sufficient numbers among the socialist ranks that was 
the real cause of  their weakness.  Blaming syndicalists, communists, and socialists 
and, of  course, state opposition for anarchists lack of  success could not disguise 
the complete failure of  traditional anarchist revolutionary theory. The one bright 
light of  the Makhnovist revolution itself  emphasized the distance between the ro-
mantic revolutionary policy of  the past and the stark reality of  the industrializing 
societies of  Southern Europe and indeed Russia—a point that its leading exponents 
tacitly accepted in the Platform. What was needed were solutions to mistakes that, 
to many anarchists involved, were starting to look like errors of  theory and practice 
exposed in Russia from 1917 to 1922 and thereafter in Spain and Italy. Anarchist 
tactics had been left behind by the evolution of  global political and economic rela-
tions. The premature revolutionary action had not simply failed, it had helped to 
create governments that would make the organization and propagation of  anar-
chism almost impossible. From 1922 onwards, leading Italian anarchists started to 
arrive in France where they would be joined by Russian and Spanish exiles fleeing 
from repression who would move beyond an analysis of  past failures and towards 
solutions inaugurating a period of  revision of  theory and tactics that would continue 
until the next decade. 
This article has analyzed anarchists’ interpretations of  the multiple failures 
anarchism experienced following their involvement in the Russian Revolution and 
social unrest in Spain and Italy.  The criticism implicit in these interpretations would 
be replaced by a far-reaching revision of  tactics as anarchists attempted to find clear 
solutions to the perceived errors in their praxis. The social radicalization of  the later 
war years created potential revolutionary situations across Europe in particular, lead-
ing to often spectacular growth in anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist movements. 
But anarchists, who had long considered themselves to be the only revolutionary 
option, given the clearly reformist evolution of  Social Democracy before, and in-
deed during, the First World War, suddenly found themselves fighting alongside a 
new revolutionary force, Bolshevism, itself  evolving rapidly from 1917.  The rela-
tionship between Bolshevism and anarchism was initially close, both in terms of  
action and, with a libertarian twist, ideology, and would be the cause of  subsequent 
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confusion, disorientation, and guilt. In Russia, the Bolsheviks initially seemed to 
embody a number of  libertarian principles and tried to attract anarchists to the rev-
olutionary movement who would guide the revolution, only to turn on them once 
power had been consolidated. Anarchists, across the continent and beyond, were 
united in their condemnation of  the Bolshevik bureaucratic, dictatorial one-party 
state that had crushed the social revolution and betrayed the workers of  Russia. 
However, even the satisfaction they felt at having anarchist predictions of  the in-
herently dictatorial and elitist basis of  Marxist thought proved correct did not hide 
the reality that the anarchist revolutionary model had failed in Russia and, subse-
quently, across Europe. 
The latter years of  Schmidt’s second wave of  the anarchist movement’s 
history from 1894-1923 saw the pinnacle of  anarchism as a revolutionary movement 
of  the masses in Europe, with only Spain from 1936-1937 proving the exception. 
However, it also exposed the serious flaws in its classical praxis. The definition of  
Schmidt’s third wave (1924-1949) was Anarchist Revolution Against Imperialism, 
Fascism, and Bolshevism. On the basis of  this article, for Europe at least, perhaps 
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